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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD D. OTVOS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
PROVO CANYON SCHOOL, WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND, INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA/AETNA 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The singular issue presented in this appeal is whether the 
Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law when it held that 
plaintiff cannot combine the permanent impairment resulting from 
separate industrial injuries with the same employer in order to 
reach the 10% threshold necessary under the Statute for compensation 
of pre-existing conditions neither caused nor aggravated by any of 
the industrial injuries. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE C^SE 
The industrial injuries involved in this case consist of 
two separate identifiable back injuries sustained by applicant while 
working for defendant Provo Canyon School (hereinafter called Canyon 
School). The first identifiable injury occurred on December 23, 
1984 while Canyon School was insured by defendant Worker's 
Compensation Fund of Utah although the record shows that plaintiff 
previous to that time had back problems from time to time resulting 
either from prior industrial events or plaintiff's congenital back 
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problems. The second industrial injury also was a back injury 
sustained in attempting to physically restrain one of the students 
at Canyon School. This injury occurred on January lf 1986. At this 
time the compensation carrier for Canyon School was defendant 
Insurance Company of North America/Atena. It should be noted that 
the compensation carrier in each of the separate industrial injuries 
accepted liability for the industrial injury involved and paid 
temporary total compensation and medical expenses associated with 
those particular industrial injuries. The record shows that 
plaintiff has had four surgeries on his back since 1982 and that he 
had considerable difficulty with back problems even prior to his 
employment by Canyon School. 
Plaintiff filed separate applications for hearing for each 
of the above described industrial injuries in which he claimed 
additional temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits 
in addition to additional medical benefits. The two applications 
for hearing were consolidated and set for hearing on June 12, 1986. 
The medical aspects of the case were referred to a special Medical 
Panel for review and the Medical Panel Report was filed July 16, 
1986, finding that plaintiff's total physical impairment resulting 
from all causes was 50% loss of body function. Included was 20% 
loss of body function attributable to plaintiff's back problems of 
which 5% whole man permanent partial impairment was attributed to 
the December 23, 1984 industrial injury, with no permanent 
impairment resulting from the January 1, 1986 injury. Fifteen 
percent of plaintiff's back impairment was attributable to 
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pre-existing conditions of the back which were found to have been 
aggravated by the December 23, 1984 injury. The Panel found 
additional impairments of 14% and 12% attributable to plaintiff's 
arms as being congenital and neither caused nor aggravated by any 
industrial injury. Plaintiff's leg impairments of 15% and 3% had 
previously been rated and - compensated as permanent partial 
disabilities for prior industrial injuries. 
The Administrative Law Judge adopted the Medical Panel 
Report and awarded plaintiff permanent partial disability benefits 
for his 5% back condition found attributable to the December 23, 
1984 incident (to be paid by defendant Worker's Compensation Fund of 
Utah) and a 15% pre-existing aggravated permanent impairment to be 
paid by defendant Second Injury Fund. No award was made for the 
pre-exisiting unaggravated impairment to plaintiff's arms nor to the 
pre-exisiting unaggravated impairment to plaintiff's legs which 
already had been compensated for as industrial permanent partial 
disabilities. As indicated before no permanent impairment was 
awarded for the January 1, 1986 accident. 
On or about November 7, 1986 plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Review which was denied by the full Industrial Commission on 
December 23. 1986. This Action was filed by plaintiff with the 
Court of Appeals on January 20, 1987. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The critical facts in this controversy are either not in 
dispute or so well established by the record as to be beyond 
reasonable controversy. They are as follows: 
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1. Plaintiff has sustained multiple injuries over the 
past eight to ten years and has been treated by many 
different doctors for many different conditions. Treatment 
has included hand surgery, treatment of both ankles, a 
broken shoulder, knee injuries, a head injury and perhaps 
others. The knee injuries resulted from separate 
industrial accidents and compensation was paid to plaintiff 
for those injuries. 
2. In addition to the above, plaintiff had 
pre-existing conditions resulting in permanent impairments 
in the form of birth defects of both arms which ultimately 
were rated by the Medical Panel as 14% for the right arm 
and 12% for the left arm. Evidence showed-and the Medical 
Panel found-that neither of the arm impairments was related 
to or aggravated by any of the industrial injuries involved 
herein. 
3. Plaintiff's medical records show a long history of 
back problems including three low back surgeries prior to 
any recording of any industrial back injury. Plaintiff's 
first identifiable back injury of any kind while working 
for Canyon School was the injury of December 23, 1984, in 
which he reported he twisted his back while attempting to 
restrain one of the Canyon School students who had become 
aggressive in an altercation at the school. In his Medical 
Panel Report, the Chairman noted (P.5) that plaintiff had 
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not consulted his treating orthopedic surgeon with respect 
to this alleged back injury even though that doctor had 
treated him for knee problems shortly after the December 
23, 1984 incident. 
4. Plaintiff's second alleged back injury occurred on 
January 1, 1986, in which he reported, "while physically 
restraining a student my back was injured." Here again the 
panel chairman pointed out that the medical records failed 
to show any treatment to or emphasis by plaintiff with 
respect to any back injury on that date even though there 
was a reference in plaintiff's treating physician's records 
as to a December 26, 1985 report of "patient slipped on the 
ice at home and fell twisting his back." Nevertheless, 
plaintiff asserted a re-injury to his back on that date and 
subsequently filed an Application for Hearing with respect 
to the same. 
5. As indicated previously, plaintiff filed separate 
applications for hearing with respect to each of the above 
claimed industrial back injuries. Those applications were 
consolidated for administrative purposes so that the 
numerous medical issues could be submitted directly to a 
Medical Panel for evaluation. The hearing was held on June 
12, 1986 and at the conclusion of the hearing the medical 
questions and issues were submitted to a special Medical 
Panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge. The 
Medical Panel Report, which ^as adopted by the 
Administrative Law Judge, assessed a permanent partial 
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impairment of 5% whole man to plaintiff's industrial injury 
of December 23, 1984 and found an additional pre-existing 
low back permanent partial of 15%. The Panel, however, did 
not find any permanent impairment attributable to the 
claimed back injury of plaintiff on January 1, 1986, 
reporting only that that episode gave a temporary total 
disability of approximately four to six weeks but no 
permanent impairment. 
6. In addition to the above, the Medical Panel found 
that plaintiff had a 14% impairment attributable to 
problems with his right shoulder, right elbow and right 
ring finger and a 12% impairment attributable to problems 
with his left shoulder and left elbow both of which were 
found by the Panel to be attributable to non-industrial 
causes pre-existing the industrial accident and neither 
aggravated by nor related to either of the industrial 
accidents involved herein. 
7. Based upon the Medical Panel Report, the 
Administrative Law Judge award plaintiff 5% permanent 
partial disability benefits from the employer's carrier 
(Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah) at the time of the 
December 23, 1984 industrial injury. Under the provisions 
of Section 35-1-39 U.C.A. as amended effective March 29, 
1984, plaintiff was awarded an additional 14% permanent 
partial disability for his pre-existing back impairment 
which was aggravated by the industrial injury of December 
23, 1984. No award of permanent partial disability 
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benefits was made to plaintiff for the industrial injury of 
January 1, 1986 in view of the finding by the Panel that 
there was no permanent partial impairment attributable to 
that incident. Moreover, there was no award made by the 
Administrative Law Judge to plaintiff for his pre-exisiting 
impairment to his right upper extremity (14%) or to the 
lower upper extremity (12%) because they were attributable 
to non-industrial causes pre-exisiting the industrial 
accidents and neither related to nor aggravated by those 
accidents, holding the same to be non-compensable because 
plaintiff's industrially caused 5% impairment of the low 
back did not meet the 10% threshold minimum requirement set 
forth in Section 35-1-69. 
8. On November 10f 1986 plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Review asserting that the Administrative Law Judge should 
have awarded permanent impairment benefits for the 
non-aggravated upper extremity impairments as set forth 
above. On December 23, 1986 the full Industrial Commission 
issued Order Denying Motion for Review and affirming the 
Findings and Order of the Administrative Law Judge, thus 
giving rise to the present action filed with the Court of 
Appeals. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the basic position of the Second Injury Fund in this 
case that the Commission did not err in its application of the 
allocation provisions of Section 35-1-69 U.C.A. to plaintiff's 
industrial injuries of December 23, 1984 and January lf 1986 
respectively and in its holding that neither of plaintiff's 
industrial injuries met the threshold requirement of 10% in order to 
entitle plaintiff to compensation for his pre-exisiting unrelated 
upper extremity impairments. In addition to the plain language of 
the Statutory provision relating to compensability of unrelated 
pre-existing conditions and threshold requirements which must be met 
in any given industrial injury in order to qualify for such 
compensation, the Second Injury Fund refers to and relies upon 
recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in Second Injury Fund v. 
Streator Chevrolet 709 P.2d 1176 (Utah, 1985) (hereafter referred 
to as "Streator") and the 1987 case of Richfield Care Center v. 
Torqerson 52 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (02/12/87) (hereafter referred to as 
"Torqerson"). In the Streator case the Utah Supreme Court 
summarized the history of the Combined Injury Statute Section 
'35-1-69 with particular reference to the differences between the 
language added by the 1981 amendment and the prior Statute and then 
set forth its interpretation of the requirements necessary for 
compensation in cases of aggravation on the one hand and on the 
other hand the ". . .second and entirely independent test for 
compensation where there is no aggravation." The Court made it 
clear that ". . .no combination of impairments shall be deemed to be 
"substantially greater" than the industrial injury impairment alone 
unless the industrial injury impairment is 10% or more and the total 
impairment from all combined causes is 20% or more." Throughout the 
Court's opinion in that case, as well as throughout the language of 
35-1-69, the emphasis is upon the industrial injury not industrial 
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injuries even though the pre-existing impairments may be a 
combination of several related and/or unrelated injuries or other 
conditions. 
In Torqerson the Court made it emphatically clear that "the 
Commission must consider separate accidents serially in order to 
determine the percentage of impairment attributable to each accident 
and the proportion the pre-existing impairment bears to the total 
combined impairment.•• Thus it is clear that the compensability as 
well as the allocation requirements of Section 35-1-69 following its 
1981 amendments clearly require that each accident be considered 
separately. In this case the Commission did just that in its award 
of benefits to plaintiff for the pre-exisiting condition which was 
aggravated by the industrial injury of December 23
 f 1984 and in its 
denial of compensability for unrelated pre-existing impairment when 
the industrial injury failed to meet the threshold requirements of 
the Statute for compensability of the unrelated pre-exisiting 
conditions. 
In view of the above, it is apparent that the Commission 
did not err as a matter of law in its determination that plaintiff 
was not entitled to compensation for his pre-existing unrelated 
upper extremity impairments in connection witti either his industrial 
injury of December 23, 1984 or that of January 1, 1986 because the 
impairment from his industrial injury in each case did not meet the 
threshold requirements of the Statute for compensability. Indeed, 
it is the position of the Second Injury Fund that the Commission's 
interpretation of the threshold requirements of Section 35-1-69 as 
applied to the circumstances of this controversy was wholly 
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consistent with the plain language of the Statute and with the 
interpretation given by the Utah Supreme Court in both the Streator 
and the Torqerson decisions pertaining to that Section. 
V. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
ITS DETERMINATION THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT SATISFY THE THRESHOLD 
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN THE STATUTE. 
Plaintiff contends that somehow the threshold requirements 
of Section 35-1-69 should be construed to permit the accumulation of 
two, three or more separate industrial injury impairments in order 
to satisfy the threshold value set by the Statute as necessary in 
order to obtain compensation for unrelated pre-exisiting 
impairments. The Second Injury Fund submits that neither the plain 
language of the Statute, the history behind the threshold 
requirements inserted by the legislature in the 1981 amendments nor 
the interpretations of those amendments by the Utah Supreme Court 
reasonably permit or even suggest the results contended by 
plaintiff. Plaintiff makes no contention that his upper extremity 
permanent impairments were aggravated by or in any way related to 
either the industrial injury of December 23, 1984 or that of January 
1, 1986. Nor does he contend that the Medical Panel or the 
Commission was in error in not awarding at least 10% permanent 
partial impairment for either of the industrial injuries mentioned. 
Plaintiff does contend, however, that somehow the threshold 
requirements of the Statute permit him to accumulate or pyramid all 
of his industrial injuries until such time as the 10% threshold is 
reached and then he can bring in all pre-existing unrelated 
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permanent impairments for compensation from the Second Injury Fund. 
The express language simply does not permit such a pyramiding of 
industrial injuries. A detailed review of the Statute before and 
after the 1981 legislative amendments is not necessary. The 
simplest and most authoritative approach is found in the opinion by 
Justice Zimmermann in the Streator Chevrolet case a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit A. 
At 709 P.2d page 1180, Justice Zimmermann has set forth the 
pertinent provisions of the Statute with notations of underlined 
material added and lined out material deleted by the 1981 
amendment. Having first reviewed the series of cases immediately 
preceding the 1981 legislative amendments to Section 35-1-69 such as 
Intermountain Heath Care Inc. v. Ortega, Utah, 562 P.2d 617, 619 
(1977), White v. Industrial Commission, Ut$h, 604 P.2d 478, 480 
(1979) and Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. dapitano, Utah 610 P.2d 
334 at 337 (1980), Justice Zimmermann then pointed out that the 1981 
legislative amendments to that Section were the apparent result of 
the Court's suggestion that the Commission address its concerns to 
the Legislature rather than by refusing to follow the decisions as 
set forth by the Court. 
Justice Zimmermann then reviewed in detail the requirements 
under the 1981 legislative amendments, first with respect to 
aggravation: 
If the industrial injury results in a 
permanent impairment that is aggravated by or 
aggravates a pre-existing permanent impairment to. 
any degree, then compensation shall be awarded 
and allocated between the employer and the Second 
Injury Fund based upon the combined impairment, 
(emphasis supplied) 
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The Court interpreted that Section to apply only to pre-existing 
conditions or injuries which aggravated or were in turn aggravated 
by the industrial injury. (Please note that the Court refers even 
here to the singular "the industrial injury"). The Court 
specifically rejected the contention that aggravation of one injury 
can trigger compensation for unrelated pre-existing impairments. 
709 P.2d at 1181. 
The Court, through Justice Zimmermann's opinion, then 
construed the threshold requirements necessary for compensation of 
unrelated pre-existing impairments. The Court makes it clear that 
under the threshold amendment, in order for pre-existing unrelated 
impairments (plural) to be compensated, the industrial injury 
(singular) must produce a permanent impairment of 10% or more. In 
addition the total impairment from all combined causes, including 
industrial and the pre-existing, must be greater than 20%. The 
Court in the Streator case further refined the requirement of 10% 
permanent impairment from the industrial injury as being a "whole 
man" requirement rather than a combined requirement as frequently is 
used in combining impairments of various nature. 
The interpretation set forth above in the Streator case is 
still the law with respect to the determination of compensability 
for pre-existing injuries and conditions when combined with an 
injury which aggravates or is aggravated by those pre-existing 
conditions. It is still the law also where the injury is unrelated 
to the pre-existing impaired conditions, in which case, as here, the 
threshold requirement must be satisfied in order for any 
compensation to be awarded for the unrelated pre-existing 
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impairments. As mentioned above, those requirements are that the 
industrial injury must result in a permanent; impairment on a whole 
man basis of 10% or more and the combined industrial and 
pre-existing impairments must be greater than 20%. 
It should be noted that the only dissent in the Streator 
case was that of Chief Justice Hall who reasserted his opinion that 
there should be required in every instance some relationship between 
the industrial injury on the one hand and the pre-existing 
impairments on the other. As indicated, above the Court majority 
held otherwise, saying that the Statute prior to its 1981 amendments 
did not require any such relationship between the industrial injury 
on the one hand and the pre-existing impairments on the other in 
order for the latter to be compensable. 
The recent (February, 1987) decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court in the Torqerson case, supra, left no doubt that separate 
accidents must be considered serially in order to determine the 
percentage of impairment attributable to each accident and the 
proportion the pre-existing impairment bears to the total combined 
impairment. In that case the Medical Panel found that the applicant 
had a pre-existing permanent back impairment of 2 1/2% which was 
aggravated by an injury in 1980 to the extent of an additional 
2 1/2% permanent partial impairment, with another 2 1/2% permanent 
impairment attributable to a final injury in 1982. The Commission 
considered the two industrial units together rather than separately 
and apportioned permanent partial disability and temporary total 
disability benefits on the same ratio: 1/3 to the Second Injury Fund 
for the pre-existing 2 1/2% permanent partial impairment and 2/3 to 
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the employer for the industrial injuries of 1980 and 1982 each of 
which resulted in 2 1/2% permanent partial impairment. The carrier 
for the employer acknowledged that the permanent partial disability 
compensation should be charged 1/3 to the pre-existing condition 
(Second Injury Fund), 1/3 to the 1980 industrial injury (State 
Insurance Fund) and 1/3 to the 1982 industrial injury (State 
Insurance Fund). However, it contended that in the apportionment of 
temporary total disability benefits the Commission must consider 
each injury separately. In so doing the allocation between the 
employer on the one hand and the Second Injury Fund for the 1980 
injury would be 50% since the pre-existing condition contributed 
1/2 and the 1980 industrial 1/2 of the permanent impairment. As to 
the 1982 injury, the proportion of pre-existing impairment then 
became 5% and the industrial injury impairment for that 1982 injury 
remained at 2 1/2%. Therefore, the apportionment of liability for 
temporary total compensation benefits resulting from the 1982 
industrial injury became 2/3 to the Second Injury Fund and 1/3 to 
the employer. (52 UT Adv. Rep. at 24) The Torqerson decision was 
unanimous and clearly stands as the authority for the requirement of 
the Court that "the Commission must consider separate accidents 
serially in order to determine the percentage of impairment 
attributable to each accident and the proportion the pre-existing 
impairment bears to the total combined impairment." 
In summary, it is the position of the Second Injury Fund 
that under the plain language of the Statute as to the threshold 
requirements for compensability of unrelated pre-existing 
impairments, combined with the rationale of the Torqerson case as 
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set forth above and the clear cut requirements set forth in the 
Streator case, the Commission in this controversy did not err when 
it denied plaintiff the right to pyramid impairments from successive 
industrial injuries in order to reach the threshold value necessary 
for the industrial injury and thus entitle plaintiff compensation 
for his pre-existing unrelated permanent impairments. The 
Commission properly considered the December 23, 1984 industrial 
injury and the January 1. 1986 industrial injury separately and 
reached the proper conclusion that plaintiff was entitled to the 
additional 15% pre-existing impairment which was aggravated by the 
industrial injury of December 23, 1984 even though the industrial 
injury resulted in only a 5% permanent and partial impairment but 
that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for his pre-existing 
unrelated impairments because neither the industrial injury of 1984 
nor that of 1986 resulted in a permanent partial impairment to 
plaintiff of the 10% necessary to meet the threshold requirement. 
The Commission's decision below, therefore, must be affirmed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's medical records show a long history of medical 
problems and ailments of various kinds as well as a number of 
injuries, industrial and otherwise, prior to his alleged back 
injuries of 1984 and 1986 while working for Canyon School. On 
December 23, 1984 and January 1, 1986 claimant alleged separate back 
injuries while attempting to restrain recalcitrant students at the 
Canyon School. The medical records with respect to those particular 
incidents were somewhat sketchy at best, but plaintiff nevertheless 
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insisted that he had incurred separate back injuries on those two 
dates and a separate application was filed with the Industrial 
Commission with respect to each. The two Applications for Hearing 
were consolidated by the Administrative Law Judge in order to get 
appropriate Medical Panel consideration of those alleged injuries 
along with the extensive medical records pertaining to plaintiff's 
other ailments, pre-exisiting conditions, birth defects and prior 
injuries, industrial and otherwise. The Medical Panel Report which 
was adopted by the Administrative Law Judge attributed a 5% 
permanent partial impairment to the industrial injury of December 
23, 1984 and no permanent impairment as a result of the alleged 
incident of January 1, 1986. The Panel further found that plaintiff 
had a 15% permanent impairment of his back which was aggravated by 
the back injury of December 23, 1984. The Panel reported additional 
industrial impairments which had previously been compensated along 
with impairments to plaintiff's upper extremities which were 
pre-existing birth defects and were neither related to nor 
aggravated by either of the industrial accidents. 
The Administrative Law Judge considered the industrial back 
injuries separately and awarded plaintiff 5% permanent partial 
disability as a result of his industrial injury December 23, 1984. 
This award was considered industrial in nature and was assessed to 
the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah, the compensation carrier for 
Canyon School at the time. In addition plaintiff was awarded from 
the Second Injury Fund 15% permanent partial disability benefits due 
to his pre-existing back impairment which was found to be aggravated 
by the December 23, 1984 industrial injury. The Administrative Law 
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Judge then applied the threshold requirements of Section 35-1-69 and 
found that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for his 
pre-existing unrelated upper extremity impairments because 
plaintiff's total impairment from his industrial injury was less 
than the 10% threshold requirement set forth in the 1981 legislative 
amendments to Section 35-1-69 as a prerequisite for entitlement for 
payment for pre-existing unrelated permanent impairments. Plaintiff 
has contended that he should be permitted under the Statute to 
pyramid his permanent impairment from prior industrial injuries in 
order to reach the 10% threshold level and thus entitles him to 
payment for his pre-existing unrelated impairments. The full 
Commission denied plaintiff's Motion for Review and it is the 
position of the Second Injury Fund that the Commission's action 
should be affirmed. As indicated above, the plain language of the 
1981 amendments to the Statute setting up the threshold values for 
compensation in cases of pre-existing unrelated permanent 
impairments does not permit or even suggest a pyramiding of 
impairments from prior industrial injuries ih order to fulfill the 
threshold industrial 10% requirement. The history of the Statute 
and the clear interpretation set out by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the Streator case leaves no doubt as to the propriety of the 
Commission's Order in this case. Moreover/! the recent Torqerson 
decision makes it clear that each industrial injury must be treated 
separately in the determination and allocation of disability 
benefits. While plaintiff has contended that the Statute should be 
construed liberally in order to achieve justice and equity to the 
plaintiff, its express provisions properly should not and cannot, in 
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our opinion, be tortured to achieve a result that was never intended 
by the terms of the Statute or any reasonable interpretation of the 
same. Accordingly, the defendant Second Injury Fund respectfully 
submits that plaintiff's claim for additional benefits should be 
dismissed and that the decision of the Commission in this case 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of May, 1987. 
^tie V. Boorfman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
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ADDENDUM - EXHIBIT A 
1176 Utah 709 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ly or unreasonably, or in excess of its 
authority.10 
(Emphasis added.) 
Each of the foregoing cases stands for 
the proposition that an award of compensa-
tion for preexisting incapacities is only to 
be made to the extent the said incapacities 
combine with and enhance the incapacity 
which results from the industrial injury. I 
have found no cases to the contrary. If 
the law should be different, the subject 
should be addressed by the legislature, 
whose function and prerogative it is to 
make changes or clarifications in the law.11 
In the instant case, the record contains 
substantial evidence to support the conclu-
sion reached by the Commission that the 
industrial injury was trivial in nature and 
not enhanced or made substantially greater 
than it would have been in the absence of 
preexisting incapacities. Furthermore, the 
facts do not in any way indicate that any of 
the worker's problems subsequent to the 
industrial injury, including his present se-
vere arthritis in his hands, are in any way a 
consequence of his industrial injury. 
I would affirm the order of the Commis-
sion. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM S> 
SECOND INJURY FUND, Plaintiff, 
v. 
STREATOR CHEVROLET and/or Utah 
State Insurance Fund, Howard E. Webb 
and the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Defendants. 
No. 19595. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 18, 1985. 
Industrial Commission awarded claim-
ant compensation for permanent partial in-
capacity resulting from injuries to his back 
sustained as a result of on-the-job accident 
in 1982 and awarded him compensation for 
preexisting permanent partial incapacities," 
and ordered Second Injury Fund to pay 
that portion of the award attributable to 
the preexisting impairments. Second Inju-
ry Fund challenged award by writ of re-
view. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman/J., 
held that: (1) aggravation of claimant's" 
preexisting back impairment did not re-J 
quire compensation for all claimant's preexr;. 
isting impairments regardless of their rela-
tionship to industrial injury and regardless: 
of their severity, and (2) claimant who had 
ten percent whole-man impairment from iig 
dustrial injury, satisfied nonaggravation, 
test governing circumstances under WHICH, 
injured worker is entitled to recover DOI: 
only for permanent partial incapacity^ 
caused by industrial injury, but also for? 
permanent partial incapacities incurredj>rtj| 
or to industrial injury, and was p r o p y l 
entitled to compensation for all preexis ts 
impairments. 
Affirmed. 
Hall, C.J., dissented and filed an QS»® 
ion. 
10. 526 P.2d at 1189 (footnote omitted). 
II, Workers' Compensation < ^ 1 0 3 0 ^ 
If industrial injury results in P ^ S | 
kient impairment that is aggravatedjfiflfl 
11. Intermountain Smelting Corp., 6 1 0 - P * P " 
337. 
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aggravates preexisting permanent impair-
ment to any degree, then compensation 
shall be awarded and allocated between 
employer and Second Injury Fund based 
lpon combined impairments. U.C.A., 1953, 
55-1-69. 
I Workers' Compensation <s=1030.1(2) 
Aggravation of claimant's preexisting 
)ack impairment did not require compensa-
;ion for all claimant's preexisting impair-
ments, including hand and eye impair-
ments, regardless of their relationship to 
ndustrial injury and regardless of their 
severity. U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-69(1), (l)(a). 
J. Workers' Compensation <£=*862 
Threshold figures of ten and twenty 
3ercent with respect to combined injuries 
•esulting in permanent incapacity, in 1981 
intendments to U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-69(1), 
governing circumstances under which in-
jured worker is entitled to recover not only 
for permanent partial incapacity caused by 
ndustrial injury, but also for permanent 
partial incapacities incurred prior to indus-
trial injury, are whole-man impairment rat-
ings. 
4. Workers' Compensation <3=>1030.1(3) 
Claimant who had ten percent whole-
man impairment from industrial injury, sat-
isfied nonaggravation test of U.C.A., 1953, 
35-1-69, governing circumstances under 
which injured worker is entitled to recover 
not only for permanent partial incapacity 
caused by industrial injury, but also for 
permanent partial incapacities incurred pri-
0 r
 to industrial injury, and was properly 
entitled to compensation for all preexisting 
impairments. 
*• Workers' Compensation <^1030.1(2) 
In nonaggravation case, no functional 
f^tionship between current injury and 
r^xisting impairment is necessary to 
**ird compensation; only issue under 
%fcJk s t a t u t e m nonaggravation case is 
^ .
 QT
 minimum percentages have been 
fied
 a n d t h u s « s u b s t a n t i a l l y g r e a t e r » 
Tr*** been met. U.C.A, 1953, 35-1-69, 
^
l
~*Hl)(b). 
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David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Gilbert 
A. Martinez, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
James R. Black, Dennis V. Lloyd, Stuart 
L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This case raises for the first time the 
proper interpretation of the 1981 amend-
ments to section 35-1-69(1) of the Code 
relating to the circumstances under which 
an injured worker is entitled to recover not 
only for permanent partial incapacity 
caused by an industrial injury, but also for 
permanent partial incapacities incurred pri-
or to the industrial injury. The Industrial 
Commission awarded claimant Webb com-
pensation for permanent partial incapacity 
resulting from injuries to his back sus-
tained as a result of an on-the-job accident 
in 1982. It also awarded him compensation 
for preexisting permanent partial incapaci-
ties attributable to (1) an earlier injury to 
his back, which was aggravated by the 
1982 fall and injury, and (2) unrelated con-
genital or degenerative problems with his 
hands and eyes. The Second Injury Fund 
was ordered to pay that portion of the 
award attributable to the preexisting im-
pairments and challenges that award by 
writ of review. We hold that the award 
made by the Industrial Commission was 
correct and affirm, albeit on slightly differ-
ent grounds. 
In April of 1982, claimant Webb slipped 
and fell on some stairs at his place of 
employment, Streator Chevrolet in Salt 
Lake City. He injured his left elbow and 
his lower back. At the time of this acci-
dent, Webb had three preexisting impair-
ments: a lower back injury sustained in 
Arizona in 1964 while working for another 
employer (for which no compensation 
award was ever paid); a condition of the 
hands known as Dupuytren's Contractures, 
which causes curling of the fingers; and 
impaired vision in both eyes. The hand and 
eye conditions were unrelated to any indus-
trial accident or injury. Following the 1982 
accident, Webb's back condition worsened 
and surgery was required to remove dam-
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aged discs. He then filed a claim for com-
pensation with the Commission. 
A medical panel reviewed his case. It 
reported no permanent impairment as a 
result of the injury to the left elbow. How-
ever, it did find that Webb had a 10 percent 
whole-man permanent partial impairment 
by reason of the back injury suffered as a 
result of the 1982 fall; an additional 15 
percent whole-man permanent partial im-
pairment from his prior low back injury, 
which was aggravated by the fall; an 11 
percent whole-man permanent partial im-
pairment due to the hand problem; and a 
20 percent whole-man permanent partial 
impairment due to vision problems. Using 
the analysis set forth in Jacobsen Con-
struction v. Hair, Utah, 667 P.2d 25, 27-28 
(1983), the medical panel found that the 
preexisting conditions combined to produce 
a rating of 39 percent permanent partial 
impairment. 
The administrative law judge adopted the 
panel's findings as his own. He concluded 
that under the Hair rationale the rating of 
the 10 percent whole-man impairment re-
sulting from the industrial injury must be 
adjusted on a partial-man basis to account 
for the preexisting impairments. Since 
claimant was 61 percent unimpaired before 
the accident (100% - 39% = 61%), the 10 
percent whole-man impairment caused by 
the accident added 6.1 percent to his dis-
ability (10% x 61% = 6.1%), giving a round-
ed final permanent partial disability figure 
of 45 percent (39% + 6% = 45%). The de-
fendants—the employer and/or its insurer, 
the State Insurance Fund—were found en-
titled to reimbursement from the Second 
Injury Fund for 3%5, or 87 percent, of fu-
ture medical payments to the claimant. 
The defendants also were held liable for a 6 
percent award, or $3,201.12, of the total 45 
percent permanent partial disability award. 
The Second Injury Fund was held respon-
sible for the remaining 39 percent perma-
nent partial disability award, or $20,807.86, 
to be paid to Webb "for the aggravation of 
a pre-existing condition by the industrial 
injury" of April 1982. 
The Second Injury Fund did not contest 
the finding that it was liable for the preex-
isting back injury that was aggravated by 
the industrial accident. However, insofar 
as the award required payment for the 
other preexisting impairments, the Second 
Injury Fund did challenge it before the full 
Commission on the following grounds: (1) 
that the preexisting impairments were not 
aggravated by the accident and, therefore, 
were not compensable under the statute; 
and (2) that before nonaggravated preexist-
ing conditions can be compensable, the stat-
ute requires that the industrial injury must 
cause at least a 10 percent impairment, 
while here the impairment caused by the 
industrial injury was only 6 percent. The 
Commission, one member dissenting, re-
jected the Fund's challenge and affirmed 
the administrative law judge's order. It 
held that, under the statute, recovery for 
all preexisting conditions was permitted 
when any one of them was aggravated by 
the industrial accident. The Second Injury 
Fund then filed a petition for review with 
this Court, raising the same arguments re-
jected by the Commission. 
The facts are not disputed, nor are the 
findings of impairment challenged. This 
case presents only a question of law: under 
the 1981 amendments to section 35-1-69, 
what is the Second Injury Fund's responsi-
bility for preexisting impairments not ag-
gravated by the subsequent industrial inju-
ry? Answering this question requires 
some descriptive background of the 1981 
amendments. 
The Second Injury Fund, previously 
named the Special Fund, see 1979 Utah 
Laws, ch. 138, § 3, has long been a part of 
the Utah worker's compensation scheme. 
In 1919, the legislature provided that if a 
worker having a preexisting permanent 
partial disability was injured and incurred a 
permanent partial disability that was great-
er than he would have incurred but for its 
combination with the preexisting partial 
disability, then the worker was to receive 
full compensation for all his disabilities. 
However, he was to receive from his 
present employer only compensation for 
the current injury; compensation for the 
SECOND INJURY FUND v. 
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preexisting disability was to be paid by a 
fund established by the legislature. 1919 
Utah Laws, ch. 63, § 3140.6. We have long 
acknowledged the remedial purpose of this 
law: 
The Legislature undoubtedly intended 
. . . to provide protection for men who 
had already been partially permanently 
disabled, but yet were able to do work. 
Without some provision of this kind, em-
ployers would be extremely hesitant in 
employing men partially disabled, since 
an injury resulting in partial permanent 
disability of the employee might well im-
pose greater liability on the employer 
than a similar injury incurred by a per-
son not previously disabled. 
Marker v. Industrial Commission, 84 
Utah 587, 592, 37 P.2d 785, 787 (1934); see 
McPhie v. United States Steel Corp., Utah, 
551 P.2d 504, 505 (1976); Intermountain 
Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, Utah, 610 
P.2d 334, 337 (1980); Northwest Carriers, 
Inc. v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 639 
P.2d 138, 141 (1981); Jacobsen Construc-
tion v. Hair, Utah, 667 P.2d 25, 26 (1983). 
The provision added in 1919 is now in 
section 35-1-69 of the Code. Insofar as 
pertinent here, it remained substantially 
unchanged from 1919 until 1963. At that 
time, the statute was amended to clarify 
that the preexisting permanent partial dis-
ability did not have to be the result of an 
industrial accident; it could be the result of 
"accidental injury, disease, or congenital 
causes." 1963 Utah Laws, ch. 49, § 1. 
The important thing was that some disabili-
ty predated the industrial accident. The 
1963 amendment also changed the statute 
to require that the permanent incapacity 
resulting from the combined impairments 
be "substantially greater" than would have 
been the case if there had been no preexist-
ing incapacity. Id. The prior law had re-
quired only that the incapacity from the 
combined injuries be "greater" than other-
wise. 
During the years immediately before the 
1981 amendments, this law was interpreted 
in several significant cases. On the quanti-
tative question of what degree of increased 
incapacity was required by the words "sub-
stantially greater," the Court held that it 
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was enough if the contribution of the 
preexisting impairment to the total com-
bined impairment was "definite and mea-
surable." Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. v. Ortega, Utah, 562 P.2d 617, 619 
(1977). A qualitative question was also 
raised as to whether the words "substan-
tially greater" required that any particular 
relationship exist between the industrial in-
jury and the preexisting impairment The 
Second Injury Fund contended that there 
should be no compensation for preexisting 
impairments unless there was some causal 
or functional relationship between the 
preexisting impairment and the industrial 
injury. The Court rejected this contention. 
It was enough if the two impairments cu-
mulatively resulted in a greater degree of 
disability. Intermountain Smelting Corp. 
v. Capitano, 610 P.2d at 337; see Kincheloe 
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Utah, 656 P.2d 
440, 442 (1982) (discussing Capitano hold-
ing). Finally, the Court made it plain that 
section 35-1-69's language covering preex-
isting impairments caused by "injury, dis-
ease, or congenital causes" was broad 
enough to reach psychiatric impairments, as 
well as those occasioned by old age, mental 
inability and lack of training. See Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562 
P.2d at 620; Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. 
Industrial Commission, 639 P.2d at 141-
42. 
The Industrial Commission apparently 
did not agree with the Ortega decision, and 
perhaps others of this group, and declined 
to follow them in several cases, either re-
fusing to award compensation for preexist-
ing impairments or refusing to order pay-
ment by the Second Injury Fund, thus re-
quiring the employer to pay the full com-
pensation award. See White v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 604 P.2d 478, 480 
(1979); Capitano, 610 P.2d at 337; Utah 
Legislative Survey-1981, 1982 Utah L.Rev. 
212, 213-14 & nn. 652-54. This Court sug-
gested that the Commission address its 
concerns to the legislature, which has the 
power to change the statute, rather than 
taking the matter into its own hands by 
refusing to follow this Court's decisions. 
Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capi-
tano, 610 P.2d at 337. The 1981 amend-
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ments to section 35-1-69 are the ap-
parent result of legislative consideration of 
these various issues, or so we were in-
formed at oral argument by counsel for the 
Second Injury Fund. 
The differences between the language 
added by the 1981 amendment and the pri-
or statute are as follows: 
35-1-69. COMBINED INJURIES RE-
SULTING IN PERMANENT INCAPAC-
ITY—PAYMENTOT^ 
JURY FUND—TRAINING OF EM-
PLOYEE. (1) If any employee who has 
previously incurred a permanent incapac-
ity by accidental injury, disease, or con-
genital causes, sustains an industrial in-
jury for which either compensation aa4 
or medical care, or both, is provided by 
this title that results in permanent inca-
pacity which is substantially greater than 
he would have incurred if he had not had 
the pre-existing incapacity, or which ag-
gravates or is aggravated by such pre-
existing incapacity, compensation, &»d 
medical care, which medical care and oth-
er related items ate as outlined in section 
35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of 
the combined injuries, but the liability of 
the employer for such compensation, a»d 
medical care, and other related items 
shall be for the industrial injury only and 
the remainder shall be paid out of the 
special second injury fund provided for in 
section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter referred to 
as the "special fund." 
For purposes of this section, (a) any 
aggravation of a pre-existing injury, dis-
ease, or congenital cause shall be deemed 
"substantially greater", and compensa-
tion, medical care, and other related 
items shall be awarded on the basis of 
the combined injuries as provided above; 
provided, however, that (b) where there 
is no such aggravation, no award for 
combined injuries shall be made unless 
the percentage of permanent physical im-
pairment attributable to the industrial 
injury is 10% or greater and the percent-
age of permanent physical impairment 
1. Although the test of "substantially greater" set 
out in Ortega has been displaced, the amend-
ments left intact the Court's rulings in Capitano, 
on the lack of need for a causal or functional 
resulting from all causes and conditions^ 
including: the industrial injury, is greater 
than 20%. Where the pre-existing inca-
pacity referred to in subsection (l)(b) of 
this section previously has been compen-
sated for, in whole or in part, as a perma-
nent partial disability under this act or 
the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
Law, such compensation shall be deduct-
ed from the liability assessed to the sec-
ond injury fund under this paragraph. 
(Underlined material added and lined-out 
material deleted by 1981 amendment.) 
The amendment described the relation-
ship that must necessarily exist between 
the preexisting impairment and the indus-
trial injury impairment in order for both 
impairments to be compensated. In effect, 
it gave definition to the concepts underly-
ing the term "substantially greater." It 
has displaced the "definite and measura-
ble" contribution to impairment definition 
of "substantially greater" articulated by 
this Court in Ortega (although it would not 
change the result there) and substituted 
two more concrete tests that deal different-
ly with situations where an industrial inju-
ry aggravates or is aggravated by a preex-
isting impairment, on the one hand, and 
those where the industrial injury bears no 
such relationship to a preexisting impair-
ment, on the other.1 See Utah Legislative 
Survey-1981, 1982 Utah L.Rev. 212, 214. 
[1] The first of these new tests we 
must consider is the "aggravation" test 
added to both quoted paragraphs of section 
35-1-69(1). The language added by the 
1981 amendments is not without redundan-
cies and ambiguities. Specifically, the "ag-
gravation" language added to the first 
paragraph of section 35-1-69(1) reads as an 
alternative to the "substantially greater" 
language that precedes it. The language 
added to the second paragraph, however, 
suggests that "aggravation" is simply one 
of two alternative tests that may be met to 
relationship between impairments, and in Orte-
ga and Northwest Carriers, on types of compen-
sable preexisting impairments. 
SECOND INJURY FUND v. 
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satisfy an overarching "substantially 
greater" requirement. After considera-
tion, we conclude that these alternative 
constructions are more apparent than real. 
Regardless of how the statute is read, the 
overall thrust of the amended law seems 
clear with respect to aggravation: if the 
industrial injury results in a permanent im-
pairment that is aggravated by or aggra-
vates a preexisting permanent impairment 
to any degree, then compensation shall be 
awarded and allocated between the employ-
er and the Second Injury Fund based upon 
the combined impairments. 
[2] The Second Injury Fund contends 
that the Commission erred when, in the 
present case, it found that aggravation of 
any one preexisting impairment required 
compensation for all preexisting impair-
ments, regardless of their relationship to 
the industrial injury and regardless of their 
severity. We agree with the Fund. Here 
the preexisting back impairment was ag-
gravated by the industrial injury. Without 
more, the aggravation test is met, and com-
pensation should be awarded for these two 
combined impairments. The Commission 
has awarded compensation for them, and 
the Second Injury Fund does not dispute 
coverage. However, the Commission went 
on to order compensation for all preexist-
ing impairments. This was error. The lan-
guage of subsection (a) of the second para-
graph of section 35-1-69(1) speaks of ag-
gravation of "a pre-existing injury," not all 
such injuries. In addition, the word "ag-
gravate" would seem to require that some 
relationship exist between the industrial in-
jury and the preexisting impairment that is 
subject to compensation. There is no such 
relationship between the second back inju-
ry and either the eye or hand impairments. 
We reject the aggravation test articulated 
by the Commission and hold that aggrava-
tion of the old back injury cannot trigger 
compensation for unrelated preexisting im-
pairments. 
This does not end the matter, however. 
The amendments to section 35-1-69(1) es-
tablish a second and entirely independent 
test for compensation where there is no 
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aggravation. Under the first paragraph, 
preexisting impairments are to be compen-
sated for when the industrial injury pro-
duces an impairment substantially greater 
than it would have been absent the preex-
isting conditions; the second paragraph 
elaborates on this general standard by stat-
ing that no combination of impairments 
shall be deemed to be "substantially great-
er" than the industrial injury impairment 
alone unless the industrial injury impair-
ment is 10 percent or more, and the total 
impairment from all combined causes is 20 
percent or more. In the present case, the 
total impairment of claimant Webb is far 
more than 20 percent. The only question is 
whether the 10 percent minimum is satis-
fied. 
[3] The Second Injury Fund contends 
that the Commission properly fixed the in-
dustrial injury impairment at 6 percent on 
a partial-man basis, rather than at 10 per-
cent on a ^ hole-man basis, because under 
Jacobsen Construction v. Hair, Utah, 667 
P.2d 25 (1983), combined partial-man im-
pairment ratings must be used to allocate 
responsibility between the Second Injury 
Fund and the employer. We disagree. 
The amendments to section 35-1-69 set the 
10 and 20 percent thresholds in order to 
assure that both the industrial injury and 
total impairments reach certain fixed levels 
of seriousness before any nonaggravating 
preexisting impairments are compensated. 
However, there is no indication that the 
Legislature intended to fix these degree-of-
seriousness minimums by reference to the 
standards articulated by this Court in Hair 
for an entirely different purpose. There-
fore, we find no justification for importing 
partial-man ratings into the 1981 amend-
ments and hold that the 10 and 20 percent 
threshold figures are whole-man impair-
ment ratings. 
If there were any question on this issue, 
an examination of the -consequences of the 
Second Injury Fund's position would dispel 
it. To adopt partial-man ratings in order to 
assess compliance with the minimum 
thresholds would unfairly deny compensa-
tion to those who are the most handi-
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capped, while granting it to the less severe-
ly handicapped. For example, if two indi-
viduals, one with a 20 percent preexisting 
impairment and another with a 60 percent 
preexisting impairment, were injured on 
the job and suffered identical serious but 
nonaggravating injuries rated as 20 per-
cent whole-man impairments, the individual 
with the lesser preexisting handicap would 
recover for his preexisting impairment, 
while the one more seriously handicapped 
would not, although he presumably could 
least afford the additional loss of body 
function. The reason for this is that under 
the Hair formula, the first individual 
would be an 80 percent man for evaluation 
purposes (100% - 20% = 80%), and his in-
dustrial injury would still exceed the 10 
percent minimum (80% x 20% = 16%); 
however, the second would only be a 40 
percent man (100% - 60% = 40%), and his 
identical injury would not reach the 10 per-
cent minimum (40% x 20% = 8%). Absent 
explicit language, we cannot presume that 
the legislature intended such an inequitable 
result. 
[4] The Commission should have found 
that claimant Webb, who had a 10 percent 
whole-man impairment from the industrial 
injury, satisfied the nonaggravation test of 
section 35-1-69 and that he was properly 
entitled to compensation for all preexisting 
impairments. The Commission did order 
this compensation, albeit on improper 
grounds. 
[5] One further point needs to be made. 
The Second Injury Fund contends through-
out its briefs that even if the nonaggrava-
tion statutory minimums are met, some 
further showing is necessary before com-
pensation for preexisting impairments may 
be permitted. It argues that the percent-
age tests set out in subsection (b) of the 
second paragraph are separate from the 
"substantially greater" test in the first 
paragraph and that industrial injury im-
pairment still must be found to have met 
the separate "substantially greater" test. 
To satisfy this test, the Fund claims that 
some causal or functional relationship must 
exist between the preexisting impairment 
and the current one. To support this prop-
osition, the Fund relies on inferences 
drawn from our per curiam opinion in 
Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, Utah, 669 P.2d 
440, 442 (1983), but ignores our statements 
rejecting this construction in Capitano and 
Kincheloe. See p. 1179, supra. The lan-
guage of Day's Market does not support 
the Fund's position. In a nonaggravation 
case, no functional relationship between 
the current injury and the preexisting im-
pairment is necessary to award compensa-
tion. The only issue under the amended 
statute in a nonaggravation case is wheth-
er the minimum percentages have been sat-
isfied. Once satisfied, as in this case, the 
"substantially greater" test is met. 
The Chief Justice's dissent states that 
the statute's "substantially greater" re-
quirement is not satisfied by meeting one 
of the two alternative tests added by the 
1981 amendments in the second paragraph 
of section 35-1-69(1). He would require, in 
addition, a finding of some causal or func-
tional relationship between the industrial 
injury and the preexisting condition before 
compensation for the preexisting impair-
ment can be ordered. 
This position is founded upon Day's Mar-
ket and the recent re-reading given our 
precedents in the Chief Justice's dissent in 
Chavez v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 
709 P.2d 1168 (1985). However, in the 
present case the dissent has made no at-
tempt to describe how the additional re-
quirement of such a causal or functional 
relationship* can be reconciled with the ex-
plicit language of the 1981 amendments. I 
suggest that any attempt to do so would 
fail for the simple reason that the legisla-
ture, like the Industrial Commission, has 
read our earlier cases as reducing the "sub-
stantially greater" requirement to nothing 
more than an additive test, requiring that 
all impairments be accumulated, without 
regard to whether they have any causal or 
functional relationship to, the industrial in-
jury. Only by viewing our cases and the 
statute in this way can we sensibly con-
strue the 1981 amendments. 
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A document that has recently come to 
our attention, A Sunset Audit of the Utah 
State Industrial Commission, Report No. 
84-12 of the Office of the Legislative Audi-
tor General to the Utah State Legislature 
(Oct.1984) (hereinafter "Sunset Audit"), 
provides confirmation that the Commission 
views our cases as set forth in this opinion. 
Pursuant to the Utah sunset review legisla-
tion, the Legislative Auditor General con-
sidered the Industrial Commission and the 
legislation it administers, including the sec-
ond injury fund law. The Industrial Com-
mission has endorsed the resulting Sunset 
Audit. In its summary description of the 
present state of second injury fund law, the 
Audit states: 
The second injury fund statute specifies 
additional benefits that are inequitable. 
The Utah system has evolved to provide 
benefits for the personal loss felt by 
injured workers in addition to the com-
pensation for lost wages originally in-
tended. As a result, the state Supreme 
Court now interprets the second injury 
fund statute to compensate the person-
al loss felt for any handicap that pre-
cedes the industrial accident. We feel 
that these additional benefits are ineq-
uitable and do nothing to promote the 
fund's stated purpose of removing disin-
centives to hire the handicapped. 
Sunset Audit at ii. (Emphasis added.) 
The report itself describes some of the 
handicaps referred to in the summary as 
"such preexisting conditions as thirty-year-
old deer hunting accidents, old football in-
juries, and psychological disorders; some 
. have even attempted compensation for obe-
sity and alcoholism " Sunset Audit at 
18. Although the Commission, like the 
Legislative Auditor General, apparently 
finds the results required by the statute as 
we have construed it to be unpalatable, it 
2. The Commission's agreement with the report 
and conclusions of the Sunset Audit is evi-
denced by a letter appended to it, dated October 
12, 1984, and signed by all three commissioners. 
It states: 
We have reviewed the audit and are in 
agreement with the findings and recommen-
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has been following them, if the award in 
this case is any example.2 
The dissent of the Chief Justice in Cha-
vez reads into our earlier cases limitations 
on recovery which, I submit, can be found 
there only by creative hindsight. The rea-
son for this attempt to limit recovery under 
our earlier cases is understandable. It has 
become apparent that the Commission, in 
implementing those decisions, has felt com-
pelled to award compensation to those, 
such as Mr. Webb in the present case, who 
suffer from preexisting impairments entire-
ly unrelated to their industrial injuries. An 
industrial injury can thus trigger compen-
sation to an employee for a whole laundry 
list of infirmities that in no way worsened 
the industrially caused impairment 
Apparently the Legislative Auditor Gen-
eral and the Commission also agree that 
this policy is improvident. The Commis-
sion's actions, however, are plainly the re-
sult of a fair reading of both our prior 
decisions and the statute's vague language. 
The legislature, presumably relying upon 
the statutory interpretation reflected in our 
cases, already acted in 1981 by passing 
amendments aimed at limiting awards from 
the Second Injury Fund. 
All this may be coming to a head with 
the Sunset Audit's recommendation, en-
dorsed by the Commission, that the statute 
be even more sharply limited, if not; re-
pealed. The Audit asserts that the Fund, 
even with the 1981 amendments, no longer 
serves the purpose for which it was de-
signed and that awards under the second 
injury fund statute are no longer consonant 
with the basic policy of the worker's com-
pensation statutes which it was designed to 
complement. 
Under those circumstances, matters have 
gone too far for this Court to attempt to 
remedy by judicial fiat problems created by 
what some see as an outdated statutory 
policy and by our earlier decisions attempt-
dations As you know, we have been 
working toward the accomplishment of the 
recommendations pertaining to the . . . Sec-
ond Injury Fund for some time but have been 
hampered by the factors stated in the audit 
report. 
Sunset Audit app. (1984). 
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ing to implement the policy and to construe 
the statute's unclear language. The legis-
lature has studied and acted upon the mat-
ter. It may act again in the future. We 
must respect its actions and leave with it 
the responsibility for further statutory 
changes. The legislature is certainly bet-
ter suited than we to weigh policy consider-
ations and to articulate new standards for 
the Commission to follow, especially when 
the statute with which we are faced is not 
a model of clarity. The best we can do is 
explain what we think the legislature has 
achieved through the amendments and then 
leave the matter in its hands for further 
action. 
We affirm the order of the Commission 
for the reasons set forth in this opinion. 
STEWART, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
I concur in the conclusion reached by the 
majority that the Commission erred in its 
determination that aggravation of any one 
preexisting incapacity requires compensa-
tion for all preexisting incapacities. How-
ever, for the basic reasons set forth in my 
dissent in Chavez v. Industrial Commis-
sion, Utah, 709 P.2d 1168 (1985), I do not 
join the majority in its holding that no 
functional relationship is necessary be-
tween the industrial incapacity and the 
preexisting incapacity in order to support 
an award of compensation. 
The "substantially greater" requirement 
of section 35-1-69(1) remains intact follow-
ing the 1981 amendments. Consequently, I 
would reverse the contrary order of the 
Commission. 
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